Tuesday, 14 February 2017

Econocracy

I have yet to read "The Econocracy: The Perils of Leaving Economics to the Experts" by Joe Earle, Cahal Moran and Zach Ward-Perkins but I have been reading this review of the book by Aditya Chakrabortty and it has caused me to reflect further on my own experience of studying economics.

Like Earle, Moran and Ward-Perkins, I studied for an undergraduate economics degree at the University of Manchester. To me, in 1965, the course structure seemed fragmented: I had assumed that I would study mostly economics (although I had no idea what that involved and had chosen it for rebellious reasons).  I was puzzled by the requirement to study social anthropology (what did witchcraft among the Azande have to do with anything?) and politics, although I enjoyed both and found them much easier than my choice of option, accounting.

The course had in fact provided a very broad base of social science study, although the links between the different parts of the programme were not emphasised and it was not until I started my doctoral studies many years later that the links dawned on me. It was also many years before I realised that I had been taught by very distinguished scholars in politics (W.J.M.Mackenzie) and social anthropology (Max Gluckman).

But what about the economics courses? I remember that the main textbook was the first edition of An Introduction to Positive Economics by Richard Lipsey. I remember breathing in the smell of my brand new copy. I also remember reading the first chapter time after time in the hope that eventually I would understand it... We also used Samuelson's Economics (a book which gets its own Wikipedia entry) which I found much easier to understand. Or perhaps the diagrams were prettier. I remember that our classes were taught by two young men called David, Colman and Metcalf, who both went on to have very distinguished academic careers, although I didn't understand what they talked about.

My main problem with economics was the models. They required so many assumptions that I couldn't see how the abstractions helped with understanding the complexity of real life problems. I could - eventually - grasp the idea behind the trade-off between guns and butter but how exactly did this explain how decisions about national resources were actually made? What did the Phillips curve actually mean? This puzzlement extended into aspects of accounting: I shed tears over double entry bookkeeping for the whole of the first term until the penny dropped and I managed to produce a balance sheet that balanced.. but what exactly was the point? I hit this problem again when I began my PhD work and found that the corporate governance literature was largely predicated on principal-agent theory, the assumptions of which, to me, led to a very narrow analysis of my area of interest, board behaviour.* 

According to the book review, the Manchester students had a similar problem with abstract models and prompted by this review I look forward to reading their account. But Chakrabortty, as he makes clear, was closely involved with the students and the developments subsequent to their challenge to the Manchester curriculum and I'd like to hear other views - I'd particularly like to know how the Manchester lecturers dealt with the challenge.  Chakrabortty also states: "The authors analysed 174 economics modules for seven Russell Group universities, making this the most comprehensive curriculum review I know of." One could, of course, argue that Russell Group graduates are more likely to have significant future influence as economists than graduates from other universities but my former colleagues were certainly teaching heterodox economics long before the financial crisis which precipitated the story behind this book.

I like the idea of students challenging the curriculum, not because it's too challenging for them (not unusual among my accounting students over the years) but because it doesn't address real world problems. More power to their elbows!

*the late Sumantra Ghoshal, Professor of Strategic and International Management at the London business School, argued persuasively that the teaching of agency theory in business schools had very negative consequences on actual behaviour. The theory has been broadened more recently with scholars developing behavioural agency theory models.

Ghoshal, S (2005)  Bad Management Theories Are Destroying Good Management Practices Academy of Management Learning & Education, Vol. 4, No. 1, 75–91.


Monday, 6 February 2017

Random thoughts on the scope of corporate governance

I've been following tweets about the HBOS fraud from well-informed people and, not for the first time, I wonder how it is possible to distinguish between corporate governance failure, audit failure, poor business decisions and outright fraud. This distinction matters in placing blame - which may, of course, be shared - and in considering regulatory responses.

If corporate governance is about how companies are directed and controlled, any failure of direction or control could be deemed corporate governance failure. But businesses do fail, for all sorts of reasons, not all of which could be anticipated or managed.

Corporate governance failure implicates the board of directors. Audit failure implicates not only the auditor but also the wider profession. Poor business decisions may lie with the board and/or senior management: they could be the result of poor business strategy (the fault of the board?), poor operational implementation (the fault of management?) or lack of proper oversight by the board.

Experienced NEDs have told me anecdotes about feeling powerless in board situations where it was clear to them that decisions made would set the company on a downward path: the challenge for a NED is then whether to stay and continue to try to mitigate the negative outcome or to resign and possibly accentuate the difficulties, as the signal of company problems affects the share price. Would subsequent company failure in such circumstances be viewed as a corporate governance failure?

Fraud is surely a failure at an individual level. Does anyone ever explore the motivations of those convicted of fraud? The detection of fraud is not, as we know from the famous canine analogy (bloodhound not watchdog), necessarily down to the auditor.  But a recent shift in thinking seems to view the occurrence of fraud as a failure of company culture and thus a further area of board culpability.

And where do the regulators stand in all this? The FRC has been remarkably quiet on the HBOS scandal and a recent call for a new corporate governance regulator suggests that the present regime is inadequate.

Some radical thinking is needed. This paper by a US legal scholar deserves wider consideration.

It argues that "the board of directors in a large, public corporation is ineffective to perform the functions assigned to it and so should be eliminated in favor of a governance system that more accurately reflects corporate decision making."

Sunday, 22 January 2017

John Kay hits the spot

Although I have spent the last few weeks studying the responses to the BEIS inquiry into corporate governance, John Kay's submission has only just been posted on the web site.  I wanted to cheer when I read it. He has expressed my own thoughts very cogently. Here are my favourite bits:



"Public policy discussion, and in particular our regulatory structures, demonstrate very little recognition of … changes in the nature of capital, business and the relationship between the two."

"...the existing structure of financial reporting must come into question.  There are wide differences across industries and activities in the relevant metrics of performance and the appropriate time frame for these  metrics  The attempt to impose a standard reporting template across the whole corporate sector has led in practice to very lengthy corporate reports, much of which consists of boiler plate, and which often conceal rather that highlight relevant information.  The recent emphasis on narrative reporting is a helpful step away from this, but there is  difficulty in ensuring that such reporting is substantive rather than platitudinous.  The accounting firms and accounting standards bodies have a principal role to play in elaborating what is good and bad in narrative reporting, but such material is by its nature subjective and qualitative, and not readily amenable to prescriptive regulation."

"The wider issue here is that corporate reporting should increasingly be – as it now is in private equity – a matter for negotiation between investors and companies, with an eye on key performance indicators, rather than the subject of one-size-fits-all regulatory prescription.  The traditional function of formal financial reporting to Companies House – to provide a check on the honesty of the directors and executives and give potential creditors the information they need before they decide to do business with a company – remains, but has become confused with the provision of the, necessarily company specific, data needed to attempt a valuation of the company and assess its investment potential.  The move to ‘fair value accounting’ is a reflection of such confusion of functions.

The Annual Report has naturally been the company’s principal means of communication with the wider public.  That most large companies produce other documents with this aim is an indicator that the doorstop Annual Report no longer serves this purpose.  In practice, most companies now communicate with the public through their website, and some such websites are well constructed and informative.

We have not rethought financial reporting for a world in which the internet is a primary vehicle of communication, in which the typical large business is no longer a manufacturing business but a knowledge factory, and in which the structure of asset ownership is increasingly dominated by a few large intermediaries.  Instead, we have bolted on new requirements to an existing structure, creating a clumsy framework which does not serve any of its underlying functions well."

Root and branch reform of financial reporting is needed, paying close attention to how business activities can best be communicated and reflecting that regulatory requirements need to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the wide variety of such activities and the organisations in which they take place. This could present a new approach to thinking about the relationships between corporate governance, corporate reporting and the role and practice of auditing. The idea that corporate reporting should be negotiated between investors and companies echoes the Cadbury Committee's idea that corporate governance disclosures should be the basis of a conversation between the same parties. 


It would be greatly to the advantage of the accountancy profession to lead such thinking.