Thursday, 5 March 2015
Wednesday, 18 February 2015
If women are the solution, what is the problem?
This piece is due to appear in the March issue of economia but I'm posting it here now to amplify recent Twitter posts on this topic.
(The recent publication from BIS "Inspirational Women in Business" doesn't really meet my call for women's stories. To me, they sound much like the sort of career stories men would tell.)
(The recent publication from BIS "Inspirational Women in Business" doesn't really meet my call for women's stories. To me, they sound much like the sort of career stories men would tell.)
If women are the
solution, what is the problem?
The debate about gender diversity on corporate boards is
mostly about how to get more women on boards: there is very little
discussion about why the number should be increased. But boards without
female members have successfully run many companies for many years and company
failure is rarely, if ever, ascribed to board gender balance. What problem is
this intervention designed to address?
The argument for increasing the number of female directors
is generally framed as “the business case”. According to “Women on Boards”, the
2011 review led by Lord Davies, the business case has four dimensions:
Improving
performance
Accessing
the widest talent pool
Being
more responsive to the market
Achieving
better corporate governance
While these are all important corporate objectives, it is
not clear how increasing the number of women on boards should be such a central
strategy in achieving them.
There is some evidence of an association between gender
balanced boards and corporate performance.
However, as with most research seeking to connect board composition with
company performance, the complexity of the potential relationships between
measurable characteristics means that, although associations between different
factors can be demonstrated, the direction of causation is far more challenging
to identify. Do increased numbers of
women on boards lead to better performance or do better performing companies
appoint more women to their boards?
“Accessing the widest talent pool” is also a persuasive idea but should surely be an aspiration at
all levels of an organisation. The Davies Review offers no evidence that such
access improves boards in particular.
“Being more responsive to the market” assumes that companies
with a predominantly female customer base will be more successful if the board
reflects this. We would expect board members to have a comprehensive
understanding of the company’s commercial environment but there is no evidence
to show that the composition of the board should ideally be linked to customer
demographics.
“Achieving better corporate governance” should be an aspiration
for all boards but there is no evidence that gender balanced boards are better
equipped to do this: there is, as yet, no demonstrable link between board
composition and improved oversight.
Following the original Davies Review, BIS has published
annual reports assessing progress in meeting its recommendations. The business
case has not been revisited, although in the 2014 report it is summarised again
with a little more detail:
Improve
performance at Board and business levels through input and challenge from a
range of perspectives;
Access
and attract talent from the widest pool available;
Be
more responsive to market by aligning with a diverse customer base, many of
whom are women; and
Achieve
better corporate governance, increase innovation and avoid the risks of ‘group think’.
No evidence is cited to support the assumptions that “challenge
from a range of perspectives” improves performance or that appointing more
women to boards can increase innovation or avoid groupthink. The continuing
stream of published research on board gender diversity around the world is
studiously ignored: the report lists “Research published in 2013/14 “ but does
not include a single article from an academic journal. Somewhat surprisingly, these
annual reports do not refer to the two studies conducted by the Credit Suisse
Research Institute which have prompted significant media commentary. Their 2012
report ‘Gender diversity and corporate performance’, while not a peer-reviewed
academic study, provides a very good overview of the academic literature in the
area. Its authors are careful to emphasise that correlation does not prove
causation. In 2014 they published a further report on women in senior
management. Again, the researchers draw on a wide range of recently published
research and again they begin the report with a warning about the limitations
of the research:
While our statistical findings suggest that diversity does
coincide with better corporate financial performance and higher stockmarket
valuations, we acknowledge that we are not able to answer the causality
question and this is an important caveat to the observations below in the
report. Do better companies hire more women, do women choose to work for more
successful companies, or do women themselves help improve companies’
performance? The most likely answer is a combination of the three.
The 2010 European Commission report “Gender balance in
business leadership”
forms part of a review of gender equality across member
states, looking particularly at gender balance in decision making at high
levels of government as well as business. It discusses the economic and business
cases for gender balance on boards: the economic case is argued on the basis
that economic growth demands the use of all available resources, making it essential
to secure increased employment of qualified women in the workplace at all levels,
while the business case rests on arguments similar to those listed in the
Davies Review. The report refers to a very small selection of academic studies,
noting that these studies do not prove causality, but this caveat does not
appear in the subsequent report published in 2012 “Women in economic decision-making
in the EU” which formed the basis of a proposed Directive on improving board gender
balance in listed companies (approved by the European Parliament in November
2013 but yet to become law).
If the business case for pursuing board gender diversity is
weak and based on unsupported assertions, are there other stronger supporting
arguments?
The 2010 European Commission report sets the requirements for
increasing board gender diversity very clearly within a broader social justice and
equality context. In the UK this seems to have been ignored. Perhaps it has
been taken for granted. Perhaps those pursuing the board diversity agenda
believe that those who have to be persuaded of its value – male board members –
would respond more positively to a business case, rather than social justice
arguments. Such arguments have been explored extensively by political
scientists, since gender balanced representation has been a political issue for
far longer than in the context of corporate boards. Corporate law enshrines the view that boards
represent shareholders but the board diversity debate has not been framed in
that context.
Since the problem which board gender diversity is designed
to address remains unclear, the effectiveness of pursuing this solution will be
difficult to assess.
Success can be measured at a superficial level by counting
the number of women appointed but this is cannot be the whole story. The Davies
Review annual reports have not attempted to assess success against the business
case dimensions. Maybe the increased numbers are still too small to have a
positive effect: the frequently quoted mantra “One is a token, two is a presence,
three is a voice” may still be an aspiration in many boardrooms. But there is some evidence of outcomes.
The 2014 Credit Suisse Research Institute report on women in
senior management noted an important change from their earlier observations:
Companies
displaying greater board gender diversity display excess stock market returns
adjusted for sector bias. Companies with more than one woman on the board have
returned a compound 3.7% a year over those that have none since 2005. The
excess return has moderated since our initial report. Over the last two and a
half years, the excess return is a compound 2.0% a year.
The researchers offer no explanation
for this, but it demonstrates that results of increasing board gender diversity
may not be as clear cut as expected. In
Norway, the country which is often cited as a leader in advancing gender
diverse boards because of its early introduction of quotas, researchers have demonstrated
an association between the introduction of quotas and a loss of shareholder
value in Norwegian companies. This has been cited by opponents of quotas as
support for their position, but again causality cannot be confirmed: it is
possible that this may be a short-term effect attributable to a sudden increase
in the appointment of less experienced board members.
Evidence from previous
interventions mandating board composition suggests that such a policy may not
be effective. In the UK, the initial pressure to influence board composition
came in 1992 in the Cadbury Committee’s proposal that boards should appoint
specified numbers of independent non-executive directors to strengthen the
monitoring function, particularly in regard to financial reporting. There was
little evidence available at the time to show that such appointments made a
difference. Indeed, research in the US,
where boards were already predominantly non-executive, had concluded that mandating
specific aspects of board composition was ineffective, due to wide variations
between companies and industries.
Although there was some early resistance
to the idea that boards should be required to appoint independent non-executive
directors, over the last two decades it has become widely accepted. The 2013
Grant Thornton corporate governance survey of UK companies reports that 96% of
FTSE 100 companies comply with the UK Corporate Governance Code requirement for
at least half the board, excluding the chair, to be independent non-executive
directors. However, across the FTSE 350, the most common area of non-compliance
with the Code relates to the number of independent non-executive directors on
the board. Non-compliance is more prevalent among smaller companies which
suggests that smaller companies, with smaller boards, may have problems in
complying with any form of mandated board composition.
The effects of this significant
change in board composition are not easy to judge but research that clearly demonstrates
positive outcomes from increased board independence is sparse. Indeed, there is
some evidence of negative effects: banks with more independent boards performed
more poorly than others in the recent financial crisis.
We still have little insight into
what goes on behind the boardroom door. The board gender diversity debate rests
on the implicit assumption that male and female board members behave
differently. The criteria for independent board appointments cannot guarantee
independence of mind and behaviour in directors: is it likely that gender can
be a reliable predictor of the desirable behavioural characteristics sought for
effective boards?
There is a steady stream of
published research studies on board gender diversity: a Google Scholar search
pulls up more than 150 publications in the last year. It is not unusual for
policy makers to pick and choose the evidence that supports pre-determined
plans but there is a danger of unintended consequences when policy enters the
realm of conventional wisdom and underlying assumptions are no longer
questioned. The debate about gender diversity has raised awareness of issues
which boards should certainly consider but imposing demands for boards to
demonstrate diversity in their composition, with no real understanding of how
this influences board dynamics, may prove ultimately to be counter-productive.
And what of the women now being
appointed to boards? We need to hear their stories. The 2014 Davies Review
annual report contains some quotes from board members on their experience of
strategies for improving gender diversity - all but one from men.
Laura F Spira
Laura F. Spira is Emeritus
Professor of Corporate Governance at Oxford Brookes University and Academic Adviser
to ICAEW. Her book “The Cadbury Committee: a History” was published in 2013 by
Oxford University Press.
Monday, 12 January 2015
Thoughts on boards
Sir Win Bischoff, the FRC chair, has an article here today. Sad to see the same old platitudes trotted out with the same old phrases - "tone at the top", "constructive challenge". Time for a new language and a new conversation.
Here's the big question: can a legal and regulatory framework developed around 19th century corporate structures provide the corporate accountability needed for the 21st century? Shouldn't we stop tinkering at the margins with audit and with boards and have a constructive debate about the role of the corporation now that owners are so different and now that so many different groups are affected globally by corporate activities?
Why not encourage boards to get on with directing and controlling their companies as they see fit, developing strategies and structuring themselves in a way that best serves their objectives, using any consequent departures from the Code as the basis for a proper conversation with those who have an interest in what they are doing? Make the conversation open and ongoing.
And let's open up the investment intermediary chain, so that all the intermediary accountabilities are transparent and governance structures can be seen. Pensioners need to know a great deal more about how their investments are managed.
Waffling on about corporate culture isn't going to change anything!
Here's the big question: can a legal and regulatory framework developed around 19th century corporate structures provide the corporate accountability needed for the 21st century? Shouldn't we stop tinkering at the margins with audit and with boards and have a constructive debate about the role of the corporation now that owners are so different and now that so many different groups are affected globally by corporate activities?
Why not encourage boards to get on with directing and controlling their companies as they see fit, developing strategies and structuring themselves in a way that best serves their objectives, using any consequent departures from the Code as the basis for a proper conversation with those who have an interest in what they are doing? Make the conversation open and ongoing.
And let's open up the investment intermediary chain, so that all the intermediary accountabilities are transparent and governance structures can be seen. Pensioners need to know a great deal more about how their investments are managed.
Waffling on about corporate culture isn't going to change anything!
Friday, 5 December 2014
University governance: some thoughts
In this week's THE there is an article (you may have to
register to read it) about the goings on at Plymouth and the broader
implications for university governance. One section jumped out at me (the
reaction of the cat sleeping on my desk suggests that I may actually have
gasped in horror when I read it):
"[The author asks:]
Who holds a university board to account? “The board holds itself to
account,” says Montagu. The CUC’s existing guidelines say that boards “should
conduct an effectiveness review of their own operation and governance not less
than every five years”, he adds."
Montagu is Sir Nick Montagu, chair of the Committee of
University Chairs and chair of governors at Queen Mary University of
London (much furniture...). Sir Nick had a distinguished career in the civil
service and ended up running the Inland Revenue. Since retiring, Wikipedia tells
me that he has "been associated
with a number of commercial activities, mainly in the pensions and insurance
field" You might expect that this background would equip him with a better
understanding of accountability issues, if not of corporate governance.
Most universities don't (yet) have shareholders. They didn't
used to have customers either, although student fees have certainly changed the
perspective of those paying. Those delivering the services provided may be
reluctant to admit this explicitly but the emphasis on National Student Survey
scores rather gives the game away. And, when the consumer association Which?
reports on students' views of what they are getting, it seems fairly clear that
UK universities are now pretty much a service industry, engaged in competition
for students in a global marketplace. So who should be holding the governors to
account?
Accountability in public and third sector organisations is
not clear cut but their approach has been hugely influenced by developments in
the corporate sector. Codes have proliferated, providing legitimation but they
are established and revised with little consideration for assessing their
effectiveness:
"The CUC is developing a new code for governing bodies.
Montagu says that while there was a need to update the existing code drawn up
in 2004, this is not a response to any cases of governance fractures or to the
emerging market. Although following the code is voluntary, the “underlying
assumption” is “comply or explain”, he says. The revised code is expected to be
published by mid December and will have the “support” of Hefce, although
Montagu stresses that it is not the funding council’s code."
The adoption of the voluntary code approach in the corporate
sector was an attempt to avoid the imposition of legislation. The article
suggests that the university sector would do well to reform its governance for
the same reason: it appears that legislation may be introduced in Scotland. But
such a reform would need to address the very fundamental issue of accountability.
My own experience of university governance has been
instructive. After I published my
research into audit committees, I was asked to join the university audit
committee. I agreed very reluctantly. I
was the only woman and the only academic on the committee. As an employee, I
felt uncomfortable about my informal co-option. My role was unclear since I was
not an elected representative of any group and the committee could have drawn
on my expertise without me being a committee member (as indeed a later chair of
the committee did, by taking me to lunch occasionally). At the time, I was
researching into the relationship between risk management and internal audit
but whenever I raised the issue of risk I was told that the university was
fully insured, internal audit was outsourced and no discussion was needed.
There were occasions when I felt that the committee had exceeded its remit but
my concerns were dismissed. The dynamics of the committee were odd and it took
me a long time to work out the hidden relationships. Evaluation? The audit committee reviewed itself in a general discussion over a very good Xmas lunch in the university restaurant.
It was not a happy experience: I resigned
after a couple of years and no one asked why. I believe that things changed
significantly under the subsequent chairman.
Not long after this I was invited to speak at a HEFCE event
for chairs of governors and audit committees, on the role of the audit
committee. After the plenary session, the attendees were put into groups and
asked to discuss what audit committees should do in various scenarios -
fictional, but I was told based in part on real events. I sat in on several of
these and the discussions revealed some really different perspectives. But for
me the most interesting part was the question I was repeatedly asked : how can
I get my vice chancellor to tell me what's going on on the academic side?
The traditional model of university governance (beautifully glimpsed in F. M. Cornford's Microcosmographia Academica) had academics at centre stage. Different management structures have changed that. But aren't boards of governors accountable to them, too?
Sunday, 23 November 2014
"Too Big to Jail"
Lawrence Summers' review in the FT of Brandon Garrett's book "Too Big to Jail" caught my eye this weekend. Summers makes the important observation that the work of legal scholars is often "prescriptive but without a strong empirical foundation". This has been true of much of the literature I've read by US authors, less so of those from the UK, but it is changing. I remember being delighted to find a paper by US legal scholars on board gender diversity which was based on interviews with those involved, very unusual within that stream of literature.
I have yet to read the book but Summers uses the Arthur Andersen/ Enron example to illustrate the inadequacies of punishment of corporate fraud. The impact on those employed by AA and completely unconnected with the Enron relationship was huge and unfair (see here, here and here ) and punishment of the individuals whose dereliction could be proved might have paralleled that suffered by the Enron executives but I am not sure that this is a good example and oddly Summers does not mention that the firm's conviction was later overturned.
Summers suggests that a different structural approach to accountability might improve policy in this area. He uses the dreaded term "nexus of contracts" which, to me, conjures up agency theory and all that is wrong with that approach but, language aside, he may have a good idea. I have been impressed by the paper by Kelli Alces which proposes that boards of directors are no longer fit for purpose. It is surely time for a substantial review of the fundamentals of corporate accountability and our consequential legislative arrangements.
The comments on Summers' review largely focus on whether he should be given a platform in the FT at all, given his controversial past. More importantly, in my view, it should be recognised that he writes from a US perspective. He acknowledges this, somewhat tangentially, in the penultimate paragraph but we should always remember that the US legislative and regulatory structure is predicated on very different historical and economic assumptions to that of the UK, and policy making in approaches to corporate crime should reflect this.
I have yet to read the book but Summers uses the Arthur Andersen/ Enron example to illustrate the inadequacies of punishment of corporate fraud. The impact on those employed by AA and completely unconnected with the Enron relationship was huge and unfair (see here, here and here ) and punishment of the individuals whose dereliction could be proved might have paralleled that suffered by the Enron executives but I am not sure that this is a good example and oddly Summers does not mention that the firm's conviction was later overturned.
Summers suggests that a different structural approach to accountability might improve policy in this area. He uses the dreaded term "nexus of contracts" which, to me, conjures up agency theory and all that is wrong with that approach but, language aside, he may have a good idea. I have been impressed by the paper by Kelli Alces which proposes that boards of directors are no longer fit for purpose. It is surely time for a substantial review of the fundamentals of corporate accountability and our consequential legislative arrangements.
The comments on Summers' review largely focus on whether he should be given a platform in the FT at all, given his controversial past. More importantly, in my view, it should be recognised that he writes from a US perspective. He acknowledges this, somewhat tangentially, in the penultimate paragraph but we should always remember that the US legislative and regulatory structure is predicated on very different historical and economic assumptions to that of the UK, and policy making in approaches to corporate crime should reflect this.
Thursday, 20 November 2014
Jelly beans and qualitative research
I do like Tim Harford's work and I especially like this.
Much research into corporate governance has been heavily influenced by finance researchers, juggling the many variables that might link corporate governance characteristics to corporate performance, without finding any convincing relationships.
But, since most corporate governance policy steadfastly ignores independent research findings, maybe this doesn't matter.
Encouragement for qualitative research approaches could make a difference. It's very challenging to do. Access to those involved in corporate governance can be difficult to secure and collecting data through interviewing is fraught with pitfalls. Funding applications may be judged by people with little experience of qualitative methods. Condensing a plethora of rich insights into a standard sized journal article is not easy. But this type of approach can usefully highlight the huge variety of practice and experience hidden behind the boardroom door and perhaps cause policy makers to think a little more deeply about the potential consequences of regulation.
The jelly bean researchers could have asked why people eat jelly beans in the first place...
Much research into corporate governance has been heavily influenced by finance researchers, juggling the many variables that might link corporate governance characteristics to corporate performance, without finding any convincing relationships.
But, since most corporate governance policy steadfastly ignores independent research findings, maybe this doesn't matter.
Encouragement for qualitative research approaches could make a difference. It's very challenging to do. Access to those involved in corporate governance can be difficult to secure and collecting data through interviewing is fraught with pitfalls. Funding applications may be judged by people with little experience of qualitative methods. Condensing a plethora of rich insights into a standard sized journal article is not easy. But this type of approach can usefully highlight the huge variety of practice and experience hidden behind the boardroom door and perhaps cause policy makers to think a little more deeply about the potential consequences of regulation.
The jelly bean researchers could have asked why people eat jelly beans in the first place...
Friday, 14 November 2014
No more codes, please!
ICAEW have published the fifth of their discussion papers on corporate governance, calling for the establishment of an overarching "framework code", to embrace the group-specific codes that have sprung up in recent years. The paper raises several questions.
1. What is the proposed "framework code" for?
It is not clear exactly what problem the "framework code" is designed to address and the idea adds further confusion by blurring the boundaries of corporate governance to include "everyone involved in corporate governance". The Takeover Code which is cited in the paper works well because it is directed at managing a very specific area of activity where the potential problems are clearly understood. The well-established Panel structure permits comprehensive representation of clearly defined groups of stakeholders.
2. Where would such a "framework code" sit?
The paper suggests that it would encompass a very wide range of stakeholders. Basic principles need to sit within a structure of agreed ownership: the FRC currently "owns" the UK Corporate Governance Code but it would be difficult to justify the same organisation taking responsibility for a "parent" code which would sit above this.
3. What does "framework" mean?
The OECD Principles are also cited in the paper: how would a "framework code" differ from these? The use of the word "framework" resonates worryingly with the conceptual framework for financial reporting, a never-ending project which can hardly be described as a success. (See here, here, here and here for some thoughts on this.)
Proposals for change can only be successful if they are based on a careful assessment of the current situation and a good understanding of how this has developed, to ensure that such proposals address real problems and recognise the potential consequences of change. Although the Cadbury Code focused very specifically on the financial aspects of corporate governance and on the role of the board of directors, it was very much of its time and the world has moved on. The consequences of its implementation have not been properly assessed, either from the perspective of regulatory impact or from that of corporate boards themselves. From a regulatory perspective, the UK Corporate Governance Code is now unwieldy because every review has added further detail about implementation, rather than reconsidering the assumptions which underpin the principles. Within companies, the emphasis on independence and the role of NEDs has led de facto to a two tier board system which has yet to be acknowledged from a regulatory perspective. Does the unitary board which brings together NEDs and executive directors still exist in any major plc? How does a main board peopled by NEDs interact with an executive board or executive committee?
There is an urgent need to reassess the current corporate landscape and the assumptions on which the underlying principles of UK corporate governance arrangements have been built. Our legislative framework evolved under very different economic and social conditions. Is this legislation still fit for purpose? The proliferation of codes suggests that it is not.
As well as a fundamental overhaul of legislation at national level, there is scope for change at organisational level. Some interesting ideas have been offered by academics. A US legal scholar has argued that the board of directors could be scrapped in favour of quite different corporate governance arrangements which better reflect the interests of those involved. The analysis put forward by Colin Mayer in his excellent book "Firm Commitment" makes a good starting point for some radical thinking.
The ICAEW papers on corporate governance may be effective if they prompt a wider debate but that debate needs to be grounded in a clear identification of the scope and boundaries of the problems faced, a rigorous assessment of the capacity of current legislative and regulatory arrangements to deal with those problems and a careful consideration of the potential for unintended consequences.
1. What is the proposed "framework code" for?
It is not clear exactly what problem the "framework code" is designed to address and the idea adds further confusion by blurring the boundaries of corporate governance to include "everyone involved in corporate governance". The Takeover Code which is cited in the paper works well because it is directed at managing a very specific area of activity where the potential problems are clearly understood. The well-established Panel structure permits comprehensive representation of clearly defined groups of stakeholders.
2. Where would such a "framework code" sit?
The paper suggests that it would encompass a very wide range of stakeholders. Basic principles need to sit within a structure of agreed ownership: the FRC currently "owns" the UK Corporate Governance Code but it would be difficult to justify the same organisation taking responsibility for a "parent" code which would sit above this.
3. What does "framework" mean?
The OECD Principles are also cited in the paper: how would a "framework code" differ from these? The use of the word "framework" resonates worryingly with the conceptual framework for financial reporting, a never-ending project which can hardly be described as a success. (See here, here, here and here for some thoughts on this.)
Proposals for change can only be successful if they are based on a careful assessment of the current situation and a good understanding of how this has developed, to ensure that such proposals address real problems and recognise the potential consequences of change. Although the Cadbury Code focused very specifically on the financial aspects of corporate governance and on the role of the board of directors, it was very much of its time and the world has moved on. The consequences of its implementation have not been properly assessed, either from the perspective of regulatory impact or from that of corporate boards themselves. From a regulatory perspective, the UK Corporate Governance Code is now unwieldy because every review has added further detail about implementation, rather than reconsidering the assumptions which underpin the principles. Within companies, the emphasis on independence and the role of NEDs has led de facto to a two tier board system which has yet to be acknowledged from a regulatory perspective. Does the unitary board which brings together NEDs and executive directors still exist in any major plc? How does a main board peopled by NEDs interact with an executive board or executive committee?
There is an urgent need to reassess the current corporate landscape and the assumptions on which the underlying principles of UK corporate governance arrangements have been built. Our legislative framework evolved under very different economic and social conditions. Is this legislation still fit for purpose? The proliferation of codes suggests that it is not.
As well as a fundamental overhaul of legislation at national level, there is scope for change at organisational level. Some interesting ideas have been offered by academics. A US legal scholar has argued that the board of directors could be scrapped in favour of quite different corporate governance arrangements which better reflect the interests of those involved. The analysis put forward by Colin Mayer in his excellent book "Firm Commitment" makes a good starting point for some radical thinking.
The ICAEW papers on corporate governance may be effective if they prompt a wider debate but that debate needs to be grounded in a clear identification of the scope and boundaries of the problems faced, a rigorous assessment of the capacity of current legislative and regulatory arrangements to deal with those problems and a careful consideration of the potential for unintended consequences.
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